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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This appellate review proceeding arises from the Fifth Judicial District Court's

issuance of a Civil Stalking Injunction. Jurisdiction over such an appeal properly
belongs in the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3
(1953, as amended), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, but is
now in the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to a February 14, 2006 Order of the Utah

Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction of this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues stated by Appellant are as follows:

Issue 1: "Did The Trial Court properly interpret 'emotional Distres' in its finding
that the Respondent engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable

person to suffer emotional distress, and should a public employee have a higher
standard." (Appellant's Brief at 13).
Standard for Review:

The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law

which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the District Court's legal
conclusion^]. Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, 136 P.3d 1242, Gutierrez v.

Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utahl 998). Although the Appellant seeks to assert
a pure question of law, his Brief does not analyze the Statute, but rather attacks the
trial court's Findings.

"[W]e review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error, reversing only

where [a] finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach

a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943
P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

"We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings
and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so." Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d

461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). A prerequisite
to an appellant's attack on findings of fact is the requirement that appellant marshal
all the evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate "that the evidence,

including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989). See also
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 899. (Utah 1989).
Preservation for Appeal:

This issue was not raised or preserved below as discussed in detail below.

Failure to cite where in the record the issues alleged on appeal were preserved for
appeal as required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) warrants the
affirmance of the trial court's decision. State v. Lucero. 2002 UT APP 135, 47 P.3d
107.

Issue 2: "Was the Civil Stalking Junction unconstitutional by being overly
broad so as to limit a person's right to free speech and criticism?" (Appellant's Brief
at 18).

Standard for Review: Constitutional challenges to a statute present questions

of law, which are reviewed for "correctness," Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004
UT 14, U5, 86 P.3d 735. Additionally, "legislative enactments are presumed to be
constitutional," and "those who challenge a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional

bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Greenwood v. City of N.
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991): see also State v. MacGuire. 2004 UT4,
1J8, 84 P.3d 1171.

Preservation for Appeal:

This issue was raised in Respondent's Request for Hearing (Rat 28) but was
not subsequently briefed or argued at Hearing. Appellant in his brief acknowledges
that he did not "present or argue the issue." (Appellant's Brief at 6). No effort was
made to preserve the issue for appeal. Failure to cite where in the record the issues

alleged on appeal were preserved for appeal as required by Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) warrants the affirmance of the trial court's decision. State v.
Lucero, 2002 UT APP 135, 47 P.3d 107.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

Utah Code Annotated §76-5-106.5 (2001) is the applicable Civil Stalking
Injunction statute. It is set out in full in Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from the entry of a Civil Stalking
Injunction. The Trial Courtfound that on three or more occasions, Mr. Mzik engaged
in conduct that was threatening, intimidating and offensive to Mrs, Abernathy and

others, and were intended to and did result in physical and emotional harm to her.
Course of Proceedings:

1. On May 27, 2005, J.J. Abernathy filed a Petition for a Civil Stalking

Injunction against Jon Mzik in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington
County, State of Utah. An Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction was issued that same
day.

2. On June 3, 2005, a Request for Hearing was filed on behalf of John Mzik,

Kellie Mzik, and Kathryn Mzik. (R. at 26-30). An Amended Request for Hearing was
filed on June 9, 2006. (R. at 103-116).
3.

The Mziks filed an Extraordinary Writ and Writ of Mandamus and

Prohibition to the Utah Court of Appeals seeking to recuse Judge Ludlow from the
case. Those Motions were summarily dismissed by the Court of Appeals on June
29, 2005 and July 27, 2005. (R. at 194).

4. Following a scheduled Hearing, on June 22, 2005, the parties represented
to the Court that they had agreed to the terms of a Injunction and on July 5, 2005 an

Interim Civil stalking Injunction was issued by Hon. Eric Ludlow against John Mzik,
Kellie Mzik and Kathryn Mzik. (R. At 182-186). The prior Ex Parte Injunctions were
dissolved at that time.

5. On August 12, 2006 the Mziks filed a Motion to set Aside the Interim Civil

Stalking Injunction alleging misconduct by their former attorney. (R. At 197-206). A
Substitution of Counsel was also filed. (R. at 195). A Response to the Motion to set

Aside Civil Stalking Injunction was filed by Mrs. Abernathy on August 15, 2005. (R.
at 220-222). A Supplemental Response was also filed on August 23, 2005. (R. at
213-222).

6. The Motion to Set Aside was scheduled for Hearing on September 27,
2005 before the Hon. James L. Shumate. (R. at 227). The Motion to Strike was

denied, but the matter was scheduled for an Evidentiary Hearing on October 4,
2005. (R. at 229).

7. Following a Hearing at which the parties were sworn and gave testimony
and were cross-examined (R. at 266) the Court entered a Minute Order finding that

"... there is evidence to have a stalking injunction placed against this [John Mzik]
respondent." (R. at 230-31).

8. On October 27, 2005 the Fifth Judicial District Court in Washington County
entered a Civil Stalking Injunction Order. (R. at 233-243).

9. On November 28, 2005, Mr. Mzik filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah

Court of Appeals. (R. at 252-53).

(It should be noted that Appellant has

subsequently acknowledged that he filed this appeal in the wrong Court, and that it
should be transferred instead to the Utah Supreme Court).
10. The District Court Docket entry reflects that the Notice of Appeal was filed
on Monday, November 28, 2005, but the required filling fees were not paid until two
days latter on November 30, 2005.

11. On November 28, 2005, Mr. Mzik filed Objections to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law with the trial court. (R. at 245-47). He did not assert the
issues on appeal in his Objections to the Trial Court.

12. Mr.Mzik's Brief listed the issues for appeal as follows:

(1)

Did the Trial Court properly interpret "emotional Distress" in its (sic)

findings that the Respondent engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a
reasonable person to suffer emotion distress?

(2) Whether the Civil Stalking Junction is unconstitutional by being overly
broad so as to limit a person's right to free speech and criticism?
13. In the Statement of Grounds section of his Brief, Mr. Mzik claims that both

issues were preserved for appeal because The trial court never allowed opening
arguments, nor closing arguments in order to present and argue the issues."
(Respondent's Brief at 5-6).

No citation to the record to support this claim was

provided.
Statement of Facts:

1. This Appeal concerns the entry of a Civil Stalking Injunction in which the
DistrictCourt found that on three separate occasions, the Appellant, John Mizik, had

engaged in conduct against J. J. Abernathy, a high school teacher of his daughter,
that would, as the District Court found, "Cause a reasonable man or woman to

experience fear for his or her emotional health, and thus satisfy the burden of proof
for a Civil stalking Injunction."
2.

Mr. Mzik suffers from a self-described "mental disorder," has "brain

damage" and suffers from "Gulf War Syndrome" (Finding of Fact No. 3, Tr. at 13839).

3. The dispute in this case arose out of the fact that Appellant's daughter

Kathryn Mizik, had been caught by Mrs. Abernathy, her Advanced Placement
English Teacher, cheating on a test which resulted in an initial grade of "I" or
"Incomplete", although latter recorded as an "A-". (Finding of Fact No. 4 and 5, Tr.
at 10-11).

4. On December 31, 2004 Mr. Mzik engaged in a telephone conversation

with Mrs. Abernathy that was "acrimonious, accusatory... including raised voices by
Respondent [Mr. Mzik]." (Finding of Fact No. 6, Tr. at 11-19).
5. That telephone call was "very upsetting to Mrs. Abernathy and she testified

that Mr. Mzik and his wife threatened legal action if their daughter's grade wasn't
changed to an "A". (Finding of Fact No. 7, Tr. at 15).

6. On January 3, 2005, Mr. Mzik and his wife met with Mrs. Abernathy and the

High School Principal in his office for approximately three hours regrading their
daughter's grade in the AP English Class. (Finding of Fact No. 10, Tr. at 19).

During that meeting Mr. Mzik " raised his voice several times during this meeting,
and at one point became so upset that he stood up, walked around Principal
Fackrell's desk, grabbed a sheet of paper off of his desk, tore it out of whatever it

was being held in, crumpled it and threw it. (Finding of Fact No. 13, Tr. 65-69).
Principal Fackrell further described Mr. Mzik as being "argumentative," "combative"

and that hostility was directed towards Mrs. Abernathy. (Tr. at 77).

7. Principal Fackrell characterized Mr. Mzik and his wife's comments as being
"accusatory, uncomplimentary and quarrelsome, rating the environment as being an
"8" on a scale of "0" to 10". (Finding of Fact No. 14, Tr. at 65-69). Mr. Mzik did not

deny that incident occurred, but testified that he "could not recall it happening."
(Finding of Fact No. 15, Tr. at 112-13, 141).

8. Mrs. Abernathy testified that Mr. Mzik repeatedly threatened legal action
ifhis daughter's grade was not changed and that she 'felt threatened by Respondent
and his wife." (Finding of Fact No. 18 and 19, Tr. at 12). Mr. Mzik later filed a Grade

Disparity/Discrimination Complaint on the basis of religion and a Notification of
Alleged Educator Misconduct, both of which were found to lack substantive evidence

to support the claim.

No appeal was taken from those decisions by Mr. Mzik.

(Finding of Fact No. 47 and 48).

9.

The trial court found that this meeting at the Principal's office and

Respondent's conduct therein constituted a "hostile circumstance" for the purpose
of meeting the burden of proof for a Civil stalking Injunction and further that the

incident was a physically threatening and violent action that was intended to impose
emotional harm on Mrs. Abernathy. (Finding of Fact No. 20).

10. On January 10, 2005, Mr. Mzik, while delivering a grievance letter which

could have been easily done by certified mail, tried to deliver the fetter personally to
Mrs. Abernathy and in the course of doing so "thrust a tape recorder in Petitioner's

[Mrs. Abernathy's] face." (Finding of Fact No. 24, Tr. at 24-27). Mr. Mzik also
attempted to thrust the tape recorder in the face of school office personnel, another
teacher, the Principal as well as the Police Officer who was called to curtail his

behavior. (Finding of Fact No. 25, Tr. at 28-29). Mr. Mzik referred to his tape
recorder at trial as his "weapon." (Finding of Fact No. 32, Tr. At 114).
11. Following these two incidents on school property, the school district

issued an Order which barred Mr. Mzik from school premises due to his combative,
threatening and hostile actions. (Tr. at 36 and 73).

12.

The trial court found that the efforts to record statements by Mrs.

Abernathy and others was done without their prior consent, intentionally in an
offensive, accusatory, confrontational and threatening manner, which caused Mrs.
Abernathy to fear for her personal safety and had the effect of imposing emotional
harm or her. (Finding of Fact No. 27).
13. The trial court found that incident was sufficient to meet the burden of

proof as a second act sufficient to cause a reasonable man or woman to experience

fear for his or her physical safety and was intended to impose emotional harm on
Mrs. Abernathy. (Finding of Fact No. 33).

14. On May 26, 2005 the Snow Canyon High School graduation was held and

Mr. Mzik's daughter was one of the senior students to receive her graduation

diploma that day.

(Finding of Fact No. 34, Tr. at 39). Additional security was

arranged for the graduation because of the concern that Mr. Mzik would provoke an

unpleasant or public display during the graduation, which might prove to be

embarrassing, confrontational or threatening, physically, emotionally or both to Mrs.
Abernathy. (Finding of Fact No. 35).

15.

Mr. Mzik left his seat during the ceremonies and sought out Mrs.

Abernathy and her husband and after approaching within one foot of them, in a loud,
accusatory and intimidating manner stated "You are the most disgusting excuse for
a teacher." (Finding of Fact No. 40, Tr. at 42, 127).

16.

Mr. Mzik, at that time provoked a physical altercation with Mrs.

Abernathy's husband which caused Mrs. Abernathy to fear emotionally and
physically to the degree that she sought medical attention the same day at the IHC

Medical Clinic in St. George, Utah where she was diagnosed as having elevated
blood pressure readings and trauma. (Finding of Fact No. 45, Tr. at 43, 49-51).
17. Mr. Mzik again could not explain or was not willing to explain his behavior,
(Finding of Fact No. 39, Tr. at 129) but in his Brief concedes that his actions on this

occasion did satisfy the requirements for finding "emotional distress." (Appellant's
Brief at 17).

18. On October 28, 2005 the Fifth Judicial District Court in Washington
County entered a Civil Stalking Injunction which in relevant part enjoined Mr. Mzik,
as follows:

6. That the Respondent is enjoined from going within 50 yards
of the Petitioner while attending private performances, practices or
events of any kind associated with the Southwest Symphony where

Petitioner regularly performs as a member of the orchestra.

7. That Respondent is enjoined from going within 50 yards of the
following-described areas of the Dixie Regional Medical Center located
at 1380 East Medical Center Drive, St. George, Utah, or alternative
location should Petitioner's volunteer services be needed at some other

venue, subject, however, to Petitioner's providing Respondent and their

counsel written notice at least seven (7) days before the change
occurs; between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on Tuesdays
any area where Petitioner performs volunteer counselor services for
family and friends of individuals who suffer from mental illness.
However, the provisions of this CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION shall

not prohibit Respondent from seeking emergency or urgent medical
care at the Dixie Regional Medical Center.

8.

That the Respondent is enjoined from contacting the

Petitioner or any member of her immediate family, directly or indirectly,
though any form of communication including written, oral, visual or
electronic means, subject to occasions where Respondent happens to
knowingly be in the vicinity where Petitioner or any member of her
immediate family is, in which case, Respondent shall immediately
extricate himself from contact with Petitioner and/or members of her

immediate family.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mr. Mzik failed to preserve the issues he asserts on appeal before the Trial
Court. Failure to preserve the issues for appeal is fatal and the appeal must be

dismissed, in addition, Mr. Mzik failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's decision, and such failure also warrants dismissal of the appeal. The Civil
Injunction was never so broad as to impose on free speech rights, nor did it fail to
properly interpret and apply the term "emotional distress" as used in the Civil

Stalking Injunction statute. (Utah Code Ann. §76-5-106.5 (2001)).

ARGUMENT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS PROCEDURALLY, TECHNICALLY AND
SUBSTANTIVELY DEFECTIVE AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN, THE
APPEAL DISMISSED AND THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED.

Appellant's Brief is procedurally, technically and substantively defective and
should be stricken and not considered on appeal. Appellant violates most of the
Rules governing the form of Briefs. (Rules 24, 26, 27 and Form 8 of the Utah Rules

of Appellate Procedure). The Brief starts with numbering on the cover page rather

than the first page of his argument; the Table of Authorities does not have any
citations to cases, let alone parallel citations as required by Rule; the page numbers
for cited cases are in several respects incorrect, and in least one instance, the

referenced case is not even cited correctly.1 The relevant statutes and cases
although cited are not set out in full or attached.

Appellant's Brief raises constitutionality challenges to the Civil Stalking

injunction statute (Utah Code Annotated §76-5-106.5 (2001)) but fails to adequately
develop them, as argued below. Furthermore, Mz. Mizik has failed to preserve his
claimed issues for appeal or marshal the evidence in support of the Trial Court's
decision.

'State v. Lopez cited by Appellant on page 13 of his Brief appears to actually be Salt
Lake City v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997). No citation for this case, or any
case is provided in Appellant's Table of Authorities.

A. Appellant's Failed to Preserve the Issues on Appeal below

It is well established that a party must raised issues below or they will not be
heard for the first time on appeal. Interiors Contracting v. Smith, Halander. 881 P.2D

929 (Utah App. 1994). To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d

799,801-02 (Utah App. 1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on

appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989).
This rule is ""stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted

factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial."1 id,
(quoting Boqacki v. Board of Supervisors. 5 Cal.3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, 97

Cal.Rptr. 657,663-64 (1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301,31 L.Ed.2d
488(1972)).

No where in the record does it reflect that Respondent/Appellant preserved
his issues for appeal. Mr. Mzik's claim in his Brief that "[T]he trial court never

allowed opening arguments, nor closing arguments in order to present and argue the
issues," is unpersuasive as there is no indication in the record that he ever

requested opening or closing arguments. Nordoes itappear even remotely possible
that the issues identified by Mr. Mzik could have been presented in opening

statements or closing arguments, even if they had been allowed.
Although neither party requested closing arguments, at the conclusion of
testimony the Court had the following exchange with Mr. Mzik's Counsel:

THE COURT: Mr. Braithewiate, any finding that you want the
Court to look at or specific modifications in what my order should be?
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Just with regards to the scope of the order.
The 50 yards would also apply to the school. Mr. Mzik has kids that go
to the school.

THE COURT: And Ifigured that the 50 yards is adequate in order
to keep that so that the Mziks can go reasonably to the school.
However, I have to tell you that I do not have the school district
as a party before me. If the school district wishes to take some action

regarding the Mziks, that's not before me. Only Mrs. Abernathy is
before me. So I cannot impact the school district. They are not a part
to this litigation, Counsel.

The protective zone, the 50 yards that I contemplated would
allow the Abernathy - Mr. And Mrs. Abernathy to be secure and still
allow the Mziks to look after the education of their other daughters.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: So itwould be like 50 yards from Mrs. Abernathy
within the school?

THE COURT: Yes, Counsel.
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Would that be more accurate?

THE COURT: That is what I am thinking about.
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, your Honor.
(R. at 266, pg. 144-45).

In addition, a copy of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order in re: Civil stalking Injunction were provided for Mr. Mzik's review and approval
prior to being entered by the Court.

Although Mr. Mzik's Counsel refused to

"approve them as to form", the Court nevertheless, approved, signed and entered
the Order on October 27, 2005.

Mr. Mzik subsequently filed written objections to the Findings (R. at 245-47).
Respondent did not assert the issues he now raises on appeal in those objections.
Although a Hearing was held on those objections, Respondent has not provided a
transcript, although the Court Record shows that they were denied. (R. at 260).
A party is not allowed to raise issues for the first time on appeal and Mr. Mzik's

failure to preserve his asserted issues for appeal is fatal to his appeal.
B. Appellant Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the Trial
Court's Decision.

An Appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
decision and show that it is insufficient. Gilmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah

1993). It is well-established that a party challenging a Trial Court's Findings of Fact
has the burden of establishing that those Findings are not supported by the evidence
and thus, are clearly erroneous. See, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Cambelt International
Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). Although Mr. Mzik couches his
issues in legal terms, his Brief clearly reflects that he is also challenging the trial
court's Findings as well.

In order to successfully challenge a Trial Court's findings of fact on appeal, an

Appellant must list a]l the evidence supporting the Findings and then demonstrate
15

that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the Findings, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the Court's decision below. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312
(Utah 1998).

Utah's Courts have stated that the marshaling process is not unlike being the
devil's advocate. An Appellant may not merely present selected evidence favorable

to his or her position without presenting any of the evidence supporting the lower

Court's Findings. See, Whitearv. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App.,
1998).

In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inventory Co. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct App
1991).

Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamentally different
from that of presenting their claims at the Hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court
explained in Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177 (Utah, 2004), in a recent,
extensive attempt to reiterate the requirements of marshaling:

Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts
from the record in support oftheir position [citing cases]. Nor can they
simply restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or
a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact [citing cases].
Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the burden of marshaling by
falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the trial court's

findings. \& at 1195.

The Court went on to emphasize that, "If the marshaling requirement is not
met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis

alone" and "we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." Id, at
1196. See also, Merriam v. industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991): Featherstone v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

In this case, the trial court made 48 specific Findings of Fact to support the
imposition of the Civil Stalking Injunction. (See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order in re: Civil stalking Injunction, attached hereto as Addenda "B" and found
at R. at 233-243).

Mr. Mzik makes almost no attempt to marshal the evidence and cited at best

26 so called "statements of fact," most of which are argumentative and do not refer

to the trial court's findings. Mr, Mzik omits significant Findings of Fact found by trial
court as well as substantial supporting facts which Mrs. Abernathy cited in the
Statement of Facts above.

Few of those significant facts found in the trial court's Findings and the Record
appears in Mrs. Mzik's Statement of Facts. The omissions are striking and it can

hardly be said that any real attempt to marshal the evidence was made by him.
Indeed, although Mr. Mzik acknowledges his duty to marshal the evidence, his Brief
devotes only two sentences in his entire brief to "marshaling the evidence." (See,

Appellant's Brief at 15). That scant effort blatantly shows the failure to marshal.

In Interiors Contracting v. Smith. Halander. 881 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1994),
the Court elaborated on the burden to marshal the evidence.

In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
finds the appellant resists. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d

1311,1315. Coonradt's briefs merely re-emphasize evidence it deems
supportive of its position, while ignoring evidence supportive of the trial

court's findings. This effort thus fails at the threshold level of putting
before us the evidence upon which the trial court's findings rest. id. at
933.
II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE
TERM "EMOTIONAL DISTRESS" AS IT IS USED IN THE UTAH
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION STATUE (UTAH CODE ANN. $76-5106.5).

Mr. Mzik never develops a cogent argument on this point. Although he
focuses entirely on the "emotional distress" aspect, totally ignoring that the
applicable statute, Utah Code Annotated §76-5-106.5 (2001) defines stalking as:
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:

(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person:

(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a

member of his immediate family;

(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person:

(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or

(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his
immediate family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:

(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person
or a member of his immediate family.

The Statute specially includes the element of "fearing bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate family." (Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-106.5 (2)(a)(i)
(2001).

The Court in its Conclusion of Law specially concluded:

1. That the actions and statements made by the Respondent on
January 3, 2005, January 10, 2005 and May26,2005 were threatening,
intimidating and offensive to the Petitioner and others, and were
intended to and did result in physical and emotional harm to Petitioner.

The following instances from the Record are telling:
On December 31, 2004 Mr. Mzik engaged in a telephone conversation with

Ms. Abernathy that was "acrimonious, accusatory... including raised voices by
Respondent." (Finding of Fact No. 6, Tr. at 11-19). That telephone call was "very
upsetting to Petitioner and she testified that Respondent and his wife threatened

legal action iftheir daughter's grade wasn't changed to an "A". (Finding of Fact No.
7, Tr. at 15). Although not specifically found to be a predicate act for purposes of
Civil Stalking Injunction, it well could have been.

On January 3, 2005, Mr. Mzik and his wife met with Petitioner and the High

School Principal in his office forapproximately three hours regarding their daughter's
grade in the AP English Class. (Finding of Fact No. 10, Tr. at 19). During that

meeting Mr. Mzik "raised his voice several times during this meeting, and at one
point became so upset that he stood up, walked around Principal Fackrell's desk,

grabbed a sheet of paper off of his desk, tore it out of whatever it was being held in,
crumpled it and threw it. (Finding of Fact No. 13, Tr. 65-69). Principal Fackrell
further described Mr. Mzik as being "argumentative," "combative" and that hostility
was directed towards Petitioner. (Tr. at 77)

Principal Fackrell described the incident as "accusatory, uncomplimentary
and quarrelsome, rating the environment as being an "8" on a scale of "0" to 10".

(Finding of Fact No. 14, Tr. at 65-69). Mr. Mzik did not deny that incident occurred
as Principal Fackrell described it, but perhaps due to his "mental disorder" and "brain

disorder" testified that he "could not recall it happening." (Finding of Fact No. 15, Tr.
at 112-13,141). The Court characterized the incident as "physicallythreatening and
violent." (R. at 266).

Following these two incidents on school property, the school district had Mr.
Mzik "trespassed" and barred from school premises due to his combative,
threatening and hostile actions. (Tr. at 36 and 73).

The trial court found that Mr. Mzik's conduct at the January 3, 2005 meeting
at the Principal's office (which he doesn't even remember) was a "hostile
circumstance," and a "physically threatening and violent action that was intended to
impose harm on Mrs. Abernathy and thus was sufficient to constitute:
"... the first act sufficient to cause a reasonable man or woman to
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experience fear for his or her physical and/or emotional health; and
thus this incident constituted a "hostile circumstance" for purposes of

meeting the burden of proof for a Civil Stalking Injunction." (Finding of
Fact No.20).

The trial court next found that Mr. Mzik's efforts on January 10, 2005 to record
statements by Mrs. Abernathy and others was done without their prior consent,

intentionafly in an offensive, accusatory, confrontational and threatening manner,
which caused Mrs. Abernathy to fear for her personal safety and had the effect of
imposing emotional harm on her. (Finding of Fact No. 27). Mr. Mzik characterized

his recording device as his "weapon" (Finding of Fact No. 32, Tr. at 114). The trial
court found that the incident was sufficient to meet the burden of proof as a second
act sufficient to cause a reasonable man or woman to experience fear for his or her

physical safety and was intended to impose emotional harm on Petitioner. (Finding
of Fact No. 33).

On May 26, 2005 at the Snow Canyon High School graduation Mr. Mzik left
his seat during the ceremonies and sought out Mrs. Abernathy and her husband and

after approaching within one foot of them, in a loud, accusatory and intimidating
manner, stated "You are the most disgusting excuse for a teacher." (Finding of Fact
No. 40, Tr. at 42, 127).

Mr. Mzik then provoked a physical altercation with Ms. Abernathy's husband.
The incident caused her to fear emotionally and physically to the degree that she
sought medical attention the same day at the IHC Medical Clinic in St. George, Utah

where she was diagnosed as having elevated blood pressure readings and trauma.
(Finding of Fact No. 45, Tr. at 43, 49-51).

Mr. Mzik again could not explain or was not willing to explain his behavior,
(Finding of Fact No. 39, Tr. at 129), but in his Brief concedes that his actions on this
occasion did satisfy the requirements for finding "emotional distress." (Appellant's
Brief at 17).

Appellant's arguments on this point are rambling and unfocused. Rather than
a mere two instances of "fear of bodily injury or emotional distress" as required by
the Statute, the record reflects that there were certainly three and perhaps even four

instances, some of which Mr. Mzik admits he can not deny or explain because he
has no memory of their occuring. Under any standard, Mrs. Abernathy clearly met
her burden of proof that Mr. Mzik was intentionally and knowingly engaging in a
course of stalking conduct directed at Ms. Abernathy.

Although the Mr. Mzik in his Brief stated this issue is also whether a "public
employee should have a higher standard (Appellant's Brief at 13), he provided

absolutely no argument, case citation or legal analysis to support that bald assertion.
Accordingly there is nothing for Mrs. Abernathy to address and that issue should not
be considered on appeal. Kaiserman Associates, Inc. Francis Towns. 977 P.2d 462
(1998).

"[T]his court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)

(quotations and citations omitted). "[R]ule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure] requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." id. It is well established

that Utah appellate courts will not consider claims that are inadequately briefed. See,

e.g., State v.Lucero. 2002 UT App 135,fl 8, 446, 47 P.3d 107; State v. Marquez.
2002 UTApp 127,^12, 54 P.3d 637.
Ill

THE CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION ISSUED IN THIS CASE WAS
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERLY BROAD SO AS TO LIMIT A
PERSON'S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND CRITICISM.

The Appellant's argument here is specifically limited to "free speech and

criticism". In support of this claim he only cites the Utah Constitution, Article 1 §1
and cases stating the proper standard of review for constitutional challenges. Mrs.
Abernathy does not dispute that both the United States and Utah Constitutions

guarantee the right to free speech, nor that a challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute presents a question of law.

A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.

When presented with such a challenge, this Court

presumes the statute is valid and any reasonable doubt is found in favor of
constitutionality. State v. Morrison. 2001 UT 73, 31 P.3d 547.

Mr. Mzik does not adequately develop and assert a constitutional challenge
to which can reasonable be required to respond. The entire argument as presented

by Mr. Mzik is devoid of legal analysis or case support. Although Mr. Mzik cites to
specific testimony given by Mrs. Abernathy before the trial court, none of the

referenced testimony in any way supports the challenge to "free speech and
criticism."

Constitutional issues are avoided if a case can be decided on other

grounds. West v. Thomas Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).

The only claim of a violation of free speech occurs when Appellant alleges
that "Mr. Mzik did nothing to abuse his right of free speech in crumpling up a piece
of paper and throwing it not toward the Petitioner and in personally serving a letter
of grievance with a microphone." (Respondent's Brief at 18).

There is no analysis of that claim that Mr. Mzik was engaging in "free speech"
by those actions. Rather, they appear to be assaults. The trial court characterized

it as hostile (Finding of Fact No. 20). Although Mr. Mzik claims in his Brief that the

crumpled paper was not thrown at Mrs. Abernathy, that allegation is not supported
by the record, (Finding of Fact No. 13, Tr. 65-69) and Mr. Mzik testier that he could

not even remember the event occurring, while the trial court suggested that he may
merely be "choosing not to remember". (Finding of Fact No. 15)
Mr. Mzik claims that he only "personally served a letter of grievance with a
microphone" is flatly contradicted by the record that shows that such actions were

also an assault in that Mr. Mzik also attempted to thrust the tape recorder in the face
of school office personal, another teacher, the Principal as well as the Police Officer

who was called to curtail his behavior. (Finding of Fact No. 25, Tr. at 28-29). Mr.

Mzik specifically referred to his tape recorder as his "weapon" (Finding of Fact No.
32, Tr. at 114) which more than anything else was how he was using it and what he
intended of its use.

In fact, the local school district independently found that this was not an

exercise offree speech, but rather that Mr. Mzik's extreme and outrageous actions
warranted barring him from school premises due to his combative, threatening and
hostile actions. (Tr. at 36 and 73).

The prohibition on contact and the imposition of a reasonable buffer zone

between the parties had no relation to the Appellant's free speech rights, as he
continued to assert complaints to the School Board, the Courts and governmental
entities. (Finding of Fact No. 47 and 48).

The Record clearly shows that Mr. Mzik could not explain or was not willing
to explain his behavior, (Finding of Fact No. 39, Tr. at 129) and his Brief even

concedes the point that his actions on this occasion did satisfy the requirements for
finding "emotional distress." (Appellant's Brief at 17).

This Court should not consider Appellant's constitutional challenge because

it is inadequately developed. There is no case authority or legal analysis for Mrs.
Abernathy to respond to. She should not be required to guess as to the factual and
legal underpinnings of Mr. Mzik's argument and refute them in advance of them

being actually argued. He should not be allowed to advance this argument with legal
analysis or case authority beyond that in his initial brief, which was non-existent,

especially in a Reply Brief or at oral argument. To allow such a tactic would allow

an Appellant to sandbag an Appellee who would have inadequate notice and virtually
no opportunity to adequately respond to an Appellant's argument.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

The Civil Stalking Injunction was properly entered in this matter. This Court
should dismiss the appeal and remand this case to the District Court for an award

of costs and attorney's fees.
DATED thissJhfday of October, 2006.
DABNEY

VtrgSwis Sa§}Hy^
Counsel for AppelJe^T^TAbernathy
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Addendum A

Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-106.5 (2001)

76-5-106.5.

Definitions -- Stalking -- Injunction -- Hearing.

(1) As used in this section;

(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.

(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in
the household within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct

directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family: or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his

immediate family;

(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific
person:

(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate
family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:

(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate family; or

(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a
member of his immediate family.

(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates
a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued pursuant to this section.

(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:

(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to
Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions.
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:

(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is
substantially similar to the offense of stalking;

(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of
any crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in
which the victim of the stalking or a member of the victim's immediate family was
also a victim of the previous felony offense; or

(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant
to Subsection (7).

(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or

used other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the
commission of the crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of
stalking;

(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or

jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of
offenses under Subsection (5); or

(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony
offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also
a victim of the previous felony offenses.

(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in
abeyance for a period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent
criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim.

(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a

hearing unless the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict,

finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance
of plea in abeyance. The court shall give the defendant notice of his right to
request a hearing.

(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the

time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no
contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance unless the victim requests otherwise,
or for good cause.

(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill,
plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice
court, a certified copy of the judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the
court's order holding the plea in abeyance must be filed by the victim in the

district court as an application and request for hearing for a permanent criminal
stalking injunction.

(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the followinq
relief:

(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the

residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim and requiring
the defendant to stay away from the victim and members of the victim's

immediate family or household and to stay away from any specified place that is
named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim; and
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with

the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through

an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm,

including personal, written, or telephone contact with the victim, the victim's
employers, employees, fellow workers, or others with whom communication
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.

(c) Apermanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon

application of the victim to the court which granted the order.

(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant
to this section shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or
similar system.

(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this
section shall be effective statewide.

(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall
constitute an offense of stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action

initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting

attorney, or both.

(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal
information for stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation

of the stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking
Injunctions, or permanent criminal stalking injunction.
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

in re: Civil Stalking Injunction
Fifth Judicial District Court

Hon. James I. Shumate, Presiding
October 27, 2005
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and ORDER IN RE

Petitioner,

C_l V1L_.___STAL_.K| NG_
1MJ_U_N CI I. Q_N

JOHN r.'ZiK.

Case No. 050500370

Judge: Hon. James L. Shumate

Respondent.

EASED UPON the part es" a:-,c aitn.ss' :as:imony. aneumeamat.m submitted at hearing,

the oar.es pleadings ana repaasematam reaanse! and good nauso anaeanng therefore, th,
Caurt beipq fullv advised in the oremises. the following is hernby entered:
FINP1NG_S._0F FACT

-,. That Petitioner is a resiceni of vVashhigton County. Utah nnti is employed as a

teaono' at Sncw Canyon High Scnacl. ana one of her stadents was Kathp/n f.Vik. the
da.apaa'- af the Respondent.

2,

That Respondent is a resident of Washington County. Utah and :s employed

as an instructor at Dix.e State College in St. George. Utah, and is the father of the student.
Kathr\_TLjMzik.

/ 3. "\hat Respondent is receiving Veterans Benefits for a100% armed services

disaOliOdescribed as a"seizure disorder" in his medical records but which he described as
a "mentaLdisorder" in his testimony.

,i

jThat the dispute in this case arose out of an investigation by the Petitioner into

papeWher students in her Advanced Placement English Literature and Comoosition
Ciass thereinafter referred to as "AP English Class"], which while she was reviewing them,

appeared to be the result of academic dishonesty by several students, something which is

strictly prohibited in Petitioner's AP English Class; and after investigation, including
telephone calls and personal visits by Principal Fackrell with several students which
eventually proved out to be the case.

/ 5. \

That Respondent's daughter. Kathryn Mzik. was one of those students, and

on December 30, 2004. her "A-" (92%) grade was subinitted as an "I" (Incomplete), and on
January 4, 2005, was finally recorded as an "A-".

/6.

/' That on December 31, 2004 Respondent and his wife participated in a

telephone conversation regarding their daughter's grade in Petitioner s AP English class,
which became a heated conversation with acrimonious, accusatory statements and
questions, including raised voices by Respondent and his wife.
7.

That this telephone call was very upsetting to the Petitioner and she testified

that Respondent and his wife threatened legal action if their daughter's grade wasn't
changed to an "A".

8.

14

That Respondent's wife said to the Petitioner that Petitioner was

15

unprofessional and reminded her several times that they had engaged an attorney, and

la

were going to subpoena all of the documentation on grades in Petitioner's AP English

17

Class.

IS
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9.

That although there was some level of hostility present daring this telephone

call, there was not enough to satisfy the burden of proof for a Civil Stalking Injunction.
10.

That on January 3, 2005. Respondent and his wife met with Petitioner and

Snow Canyon High School Principal, Mr. Brent Fackrell, in his office for approximately three
22

23

(3) hours, again, regarding Respondent's daughter's grade in Petitioner's AP English Class.
11.

That during that meeting, voices of Respondent and his wife were raised and

24 concerns by them expressed about their daughter's grade: and Respondent's wife testified
that she became so upset that she pounded her fist on the principal's desk several times
6
27

ts

during that meeting.

12.

That Respondent's wife also testified that during that meeting, she accused

Petitioner of being mentally unstable.

TT

That Respondent o^seii n- .aive :,e.oral t,m-o acorno -k m^koc. and at

one ooint became so upset that he stood up. walked around principal Fackroll's desk,

araooec a shoe: of paper off o: h^ cesK. "•"e :; out of whatever ;t was oeimg heid in,
crumpled it and threw it.

-4.

Turn Pnn:-pal Fa-kr-ei s ao^npacn of this :oc,oen: wns mast telling, and was

given in very distinct terms; and thai he characterized the Respondent and his wife's
comments as ae;ng accusatory, u-omphmon:ary and guarre:some. rating toe environment
as beinc an "B" on a scale of "0" to "1 0".

15.

That Respondent die not o-;oy tmat tne moideat oecuTaa. msteaa testifying

that ho could not recall it happening. In any event, Respondent either did not remember or
chose not to remember, and Principal Faskreli's testimony of the event ;s considered to be
more credible than Respondents.

-6.

Tnat Principal FaToel! -va^ t:- mast -redihie wtnoss oaaoerning :his incident

i-, ~.-,..L- - i^ - •»- m^ nnt- •••••im

"v- l-a^t revolvement, was retired and had the least

motivation to shade the truth one v.ay or the ot^or.

•7

That the meeting became so intense, due to die Resoondent and his wife's

combined am: unrelenting Press,re ic mrro Petitioner to change their daughter s orade.
that Petitioner K the time the meeting was over concluded teat Respondent and his wife, in
her words. ' . . . were out to get mo.'

16.

That Petitioner testifod that Respondent and his wife again threatened legal

action if their daughter's grade wasn't changed to an "AT She also stated that Respondent
and his wife repeatedly questioned her abilities as a teacher.

19.

That Petitioner testified that she felt threatened oy Respondent and his wife,

and thought that they would do anything to discredit her integrity.
20. That this incident was the first act sufficient to cause a reasonable man or
woman to experience fear for his or her physical and/or emotional health: anc that this

incident constituted a "hostile circumstance" for purposes of meeting the burden of proof for
a Ci.il Stalking Injunction.

21.

That this incident was a physically threatening and violent action, was

intended to impose emotional harm on Petitioner, and was sufficient to meet the burden of

proof for a Civil Stalking Injunction.
22.

That on January 10, 2005, Respondent, in a misguided attempt to deliver a

grievance letter which could have been easily done by certified mail, took his tape recorder
along to Snow Canyon High School and tried to deliver the letter personally to Petitioner
23.

That in doing so, Respondent chose a confrontational method rather than the

cold, "U.S. Mail delivers it" method of communicating a grievance under the Washington
County School Board Rules.

24.

That in doing so, Respondent thrust the tape recorder in Petitioner's face, but

she declined to accept the attempted service of the letter upon her or respond to

Respondent's physical presence, and asked the office slaff to call the police. She further
testified that she felt that her privacy and work environment had been "invaded."

25.

That Respondent also attempted to got Snow Canyon High School office staff

and another teacher, Robert Lancaster, as well as Principal Brent Fackrell when he entered

the Snow Canyon High School office, and even later thrust the tape recorder at Police
Officer Craig Hugie. in an effort to record statements on his tape recorder.
IS
b>
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26.

That Principal Fackrell, Officer Hugie and Respondent met in Principal

Fackrell's private office, and Respondent said on two occasions while in Principal Fackrell's
office that he was going to go to Court if his daughter's grade was not changed.
27.

That these efforts to record statements by Petitioner and others was done

without their prior knowledge or consent, and was intentionally done in an offensive,
accusatory, confrontational and threatening manner, which caused Petitioner and others to
24

fear for their personal privacy and safety. It also had the effect of imposing emotional harm
on them as well.

28.

That Respondent testified that he had been a Claims Adjuster for an

insurance company many years before, and used a tape recorder to record witness'

statements and others in his job. He further indicated that he found it helpful to record
4

statements and that he was familiar .vim now to i^e one.

gg. That Respondent coah have confirmed deliver :>f the letter by registered/
-t i-h roceiot roguested mail, but chose instead to use his tape recorder to cio so, which
was s;qmficant,y different and more teosonai than del;verv by rnrvl .vou a nave been.
go. That Respondent ta.-i t: -eomngfully adoress :n :>-'er any reasonable
explanation of why he felt it was necessary for him to confront Principal Fackroli. Snow

Canycn High School office staff. Te.oher Robert Lancaster and Police Officer Hugie. in
aadcion to the Petitioner, with his taoe recorder.

31.

That Respondent chose tc tape record the delivery of the letter and confront

otners at the Snow Canyon High Scnoo! cCioos was clearly more confrontational and
inomicating than other means available to him. These actions by Respondent verbally
orovoked the incident.

That most teliim; oas Respondent's reference n his testimony to ins tape

r,~.rder ,s his •weapon", a term wh.T rather accurately describee now he viewed his use
of his taoe recorder at the time of the incident.

- ^t 'his iac:d-nt •••=<; me second act sufficient to cause a reasonable man or

>,.->mnn tr. exDononcR fear for his or her ohysical safety and was intended to impose

emotional ham, en Petitioner, and v.as Sufficient to meet the burden of proof for aCivil
StaTnc Injunction.

34.

That on May 26. 2005. Snow Canyon High School graduation was held at the

Dixie State College Bums Arena, and Respondents daughter. Kathryn Mzik. was one of tne
Senior students who was to receive her graduation diploma that day.

35. That because of concern by Principal Fackrell of Snow Canyon High School
and. Max Rose. Superintendent of tne Washington County School District. Petitioner was

t=,d not to lead the teachers onto the graduation podium or sit on the podium with the other
teachers, and was given permission -if she so chose -not to attend graduation ceremonies
at all. because of concern that Respondent w-ould provoke, if given the cnanoe. an

unoieasant or public display during the graduation, which might prove to be embarrassing,

confrontational or threatening, physically, emotionally or both, in such a way as to detract
from the program and ceremony.

36.

That additional security had been arranged for the graduation because of this

concern.

37.

That Petitioner agreed not to load the teachers onto the podium or sit on the

podium with her fellow teachers, but, because a number of her students were graduating
that day, decided to attend but chose a seat that was as far away as possible from the
podium so she and her husband would not be readily observed or easy to locate.
38.

That at approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening. Respondent left his seat when

his daughter received her diploma and sought out Petitioner and her husband, by locating
them on the back row of the Burns Arena in seats that wore between 200 and 300 feet from
the graduation podium.

4

39. That Respondent upon spotting Petitioner and her husband, still went up to
them, and for reasons that he could not explain or was not willing to explain, verbally
provoked a hostile confrontation with Petitioner and her husband.

40. That Respondent moved toward Petitioner and when he was within one foot of!
her said in a loud, accusatoiy and intimidating manner, "You are the most disgusting excuse

i

}>•
PI
..0
2 i

for a teacher." These actions and statements by the Respondent provoked the subsequent
actions and statements by Petitioner and her husband, all of which were justifiable in light of
Respondent's stalking behavior.

41.

That shortly before Respondent confronted Petitioner and her husband.

Petitioner's husband testified that he observed Respondent's eyes darling as if he was
clearly looking for someone.

42.

That the Respondent's actions and statement were the third time Respondent

threatened, intimidated and reasonably caused a fea- of potential harm to Petitioner.
43.

That Petitioner's husband told Respondent to get away from his wife, and

when Respondent continued to move toward them, responded physically in order to insure

a separation between him and his wife, the Petitioner, and Respondent, by pushing him

away with open hands and in a way to p-otect his wife. Although it was not a particularly
aentle push, it was sufficient to push Respondent back a couple of feet. Thereafter.
Petitioner's husband made a fist with both hands in a way to protect his wife and make it
clear that he was willing to defend his wife if it was necessary,

44.

That Respondent, once he had regained his balance, moved slightly forward

and asked Petitioner's husband, -'Do you want to attack me?" and "Hey buddy, do you want

to go to jail?" Petitioner's husband, in response, said "Leave my wife alone:" anc told him to
-Get away from us."

45
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That the incident at the Burns Arena caused Petitioner to fear emotionally and

physically to adegree that she sought medical attention later that same cay at the 1HC
Medical Clinic in St George. Utah where she was diagnosed as having elevated blood
oressure readings and trauma.

46.

That the incident was a physically threatening provocation intended to impose

phvsical as well as emotional harm to Petitioner and her husband, and was sufficient to
meet the burden of proof for a Civil Stalking Injunction.

47.

That Respondent and his wife filed a Grade Disparity.'Discrimination

Compsaint en the basis of religion with the Washington County School District, which the
1x

Superintendent found was without merit. Specifically, in his letter dated June 10. 2005,
Superintendent Max Rose wrote. It is my judgment that no substantive evidence exists to
support the claim of religious discrimination." No timely appeal was taken from that
Decision.

48.

That Respondent also filed a "Notification of Alleged Educator Misconduct"

on July 19, 2005 with the Utah with the Utah Professional Practices Act Commission which
_4

after investigating the Complaint concluded that the Washington County School District had
•'. . handled the situation adequately and that no further licensing action was warranted."
No timely appeal was taken from that Decision.
r.ONCI USIONS OF LAW

2N

1. That the actions and statements made by the Respondent on January 3, 2005,

1

January 10, 2005 and May 26, 2005 were threateneing, intimidating and offensive to the

?

Petitioner and others, and were intended to and did result in physical and emotional harm to

3

Petitioner.

4

2. That these actions and statements by Respondent on al! three occasions were

5

sufficient to meet the burden of proof for a Civil Stalking Injunction for the reason that each

(>

constituted prohibited conduct found in the Utah Civil Stalking Injunction Statute.

7

3. That a Civil Stalking Injunction should be entered against Respondent.
ORDER

8
9

re

10

CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION
II

12

BASED UPON the testimony of the parties, representations and argument of

13

counsel, and the Court's review the pleadings herein, and having determined that there is

14

reason to believe that an offense of Stalking has occurred, and that the Respondent is the

15

Stalker, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby

6

Ordered, as follows:

7

1. That the Respondent is enjoined from stalking the Petitioner or any member of

18
19
20

21

her immediate family, as more fully set forth herein.
2. That "Stalking" for the purposes of this Injunction is defined in Utah Code
Annotated, Section 77~3a-106.5, as follows: As used in this section:

(a)

"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical

22

proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or

23

threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a

24

person.

25

(b)

"Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person

26

who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the

27

household within the prior six months.

28

(c)

"Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
8

A herson s gui't*

. . e.

r

.i

mtohtionaliy or kn^wngly engage,es

in a course of conduct directed at a specificj

:,o-,on that woJz cause a -ascnah^ person:

h
ii,

to fear bodil\ inju-y to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
1C) suffer emationa! cstress to himself cr a momoers of his immediate
family:

wieoge or shouvd \nve knowledge that toe specific por^on:

•ins Knowioog

-oasonaole fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his

will be placed in re

immediate family; or

will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer
emotional distress: anc
whose conduct:

irri.jces fear in the -p-^ ^^ r'f ^

"^ <° r'mSe" '*^'''^ °f

his immediate fami'y: tr

oacses emotional distress ;r the soocific persor- or a memror ,-t his
immediate tamil.

Aperson is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or kncw.poU tiolates a
pairing injunction issued purs

,;,ht to Title 77. Chapter 3a Stalking Injunctions, or

ntentionally or knowingly violates a permanent oriminial stalking injunction issued pursuant
:o th:s section.

3. That Respondent is enjoined from going within 50 yards of the Petitioner's home

gar Leo Road. St. George. Utah.

in Bloomington located at 3553

4 That Respondent is enjoined from going wi/ithm 50 yards of the Petitioner's

^ r^

of worship, tne LDS Bloommgton Stake Center, located at 200 West Brigham

R;ad, St. George, Utah; the LDS Chapel located at 3371 Mulberry Drive. St. George. Utah:
an

th» ' D* Chapel located at 3519 N'.anzanita Road, St. George. Road.
,nioined from going within 50 yards of Petitioner when she is

5 That Respondent is enj<
at

g

where Petitioner teaches.

ii.

That the Respondent is enjoined from going within 50 yards of the Petitioner

while attending private performances, practices or events of any kind associated wifh the
Southwest Symphony whore Petitioner regularly performs as a member of the orchestra.

7, That Respondent is enjoined from going within 50 yards of the following-described
areas of the Dixie Regional Medical Center boated at 13B0 East Medical Center
Drive, St. George, Utah, or alternative location should Petitioner's volunteer services be

needed at some other venue, subject, however, to Petitioner's providing Respondent and
their counsel written notice at least seven (7) days before the change occurs; between the

hours of 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on Tuesdays: any area where Petitioner performs
volunteer counselor services for family and friends of individuals who suffer from mental

illness. However, the provisions of this CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION shall not prohibit
Respondent from seeking emergency or urgent medical care at the Dixie Regional Medical
Center.

8.

That the Respondent is enioined from contacting the Petitioner or anv

member of her immediate family, directly or indirectly, through any form of communication

including written, oral, visual or electronic moans; subject to occasions where Respondent
is

happens to knowingly be in the vicinity where Petitioner or any member of her immediate
family is, in which case, Respondent shall immediately extricate himself from contact with
Petitioner and/or members of her immediate family.

9. That Respondent is admonished that this is an official Court Order; that the Court

may find him in contempt if he disobeys any of the provisions of the Order; and that he may
be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of Stalking and any other crime he commits if he
24

disobeys any of the provisions of this Order.

10. That the provisions of all prior injunctions in Case No. 050500870 are vacated
and replaced by the provisions of this CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION.

11. That the provisions of this CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION shall remain in effect
28

for three years, or until further Order of the Court.
(I

Dated this _^__./_ clay Octooer.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

Han<James L. Shumate
--District Court Judge

A?PROVE_Lj4SJI_0_mRM:

\7]?ginlusTJabney-^—
Counsel for petitioner \
\

rT^TTR Braithwaite

Counsel for Respondent
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